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Abstract 
If access control policy decision points are not 
neatly separated from the business logic of a system, 
the evolution of a security policy likely leads to the 
necessity of changing the system’s code base. This is 
often the case with legacy systems. We present a test- 
driven methodology to assess the flexibility of a system, 
a property that describes the degree of coupling be-
tween the access control logic and the business logic of 
a system. A low flexibility indicates that a modification 
of the policy will lead to substantial changes of the 
code. In this paper, we analyze the notion of flexibility 
which is related to the presence of hidden and implicit 
security mechanisms in the business logic. We detail 
how testing can be used for detecting such mechanisms 
and how it may drive the incremental evolution of a 
security policy. We use several case studies to illus-
trate and validate the methodology.  
1. Introduction 
Security policies (SPs) embody constraints on the 
access to data or functions of an organization, both for 
extra-organizational and intra-organizational subjects. 
Several access control models have been developed 
over the past decades, including RBAC [1-3] and Or-
BAC [4, 5]. In essence, these models provide means to 
describe the subjects’ permissions and prohibitions to 
access a resource, for instance, the right to configure a 
firewall or to access a specific service or record in a 
database. 
From an access control point of view, a software 
system is composed of three parts: the interface, the 
business logic and the policy decision point (PDP). 
Conceptually, the PDP is the decision logic that checks 
whether or not access to a resource can be granted. 
Technically, PDPs can be implemented in a multitude 
of ways, including configurable dedicated components, 
explicit pieces of code, and by imposing architectural 
constraints.  
In contrast, the business logic consists of the pro-
gram code which is executed to implement the func-
tional requirements. A request coming from the inter-
face is checked by the PDP which allows or disallows 
the business logic to be called. 
In the last years, researchers [6] have proposed to 
separate business and access control logics, and to 
automatically generate respective configuration files as 
well as application code from a set of related models. 
This approach, however, only works in model-based 
development processes and generates applications from 
scratch. It is thus not applicable to legacy systems. If 
legacy systems’ SPs are modified, the code of these 
systems often has to be changed as well. However, 
locating necessary modifications in the code is far from 
trivial. The reason is that the implementation of PDPs 
is often interwoven with that of the business logic, and 
can furthermore be implemented explicitly or implic-
itly. 
Explicit mechanisms are represented by dedicated 
pieces of code, and can be either visible or hidden. A 
security mechanism is visible in a legacy system if 
there is a traceability link from (a part of) the security 
policy to the security mechanism. Otherwise, the 
mechanism is hidden. Due to the lack of documenta-
tion and traceability, the location of the code imple-
menting a hidden mechanism may be lost, and so may 
the knowledge of how it works. This problem espe-
cially occurs for large and old legacy systems. Finally, 
implicit mechanisms are a result of technical con-
straints imposed by the architecture, platform or im-
plementation of the business logic. 
While the business logic of a legacy system may 
implement a given security policy, it may equally re-
strict the evolution of the security policy. This is a 
result of hidden and implicit security mechanisms. 
Given all possible modifications of a security policy, 
we will use the term flexibility to denote the ability of a 
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legacy system to evolve without tedious analysis and 
modifications of the program (detection and modifica-
tion of the hidden and implicit security mechanisms, 
refactorings of the business logic). 
 
Whenever a security policy evolves, 
1. the explicit security mechanisms are modified 
and have to be tested; 
2. hidden security mechanisms may be in conflict 
with the new access control rules: they must be 
located and adapted; and 
3. the business logic may be in conflict with the 
new security policy: the reasons for this con-
flict (the implicit mechanisms) must be deter-
mined, and the design and the code may have 
to be modified and possibly refactored to make 
the legacy system more flexible. 
If (black-box) testing legacy applications against new 
security policies reveals a mismatch between policy 
and implementation, the determination of the cause is 
usually difficult. Refactoring the design and re-
programming some parts of the system may be prohibi-
tively expensive. In extreme cases, it might even be-
come impossible to deploy the new security policy. 
1.1.  Problem Statement 
The long-term goal of our research is methodologi-
cal and technological support for the evolution of leg-
acy systems in the context of changing SPs. In this 
paper, we take a first step by tackling the following 
problem. Given a legacy (or newly developed) system 
and a currently applicable SP, can we assess the cou-
pling between business logic and access control logic? 
How difficult will it be to implement policy modifica-
tions? 
1.2. Solution and Contribution 
Our solution consists of a test-driven assessment 
methodology for the flexibility of legacy systems. We 
use technology described in earlier work [7, 8] to de-
rive tests from policies. We apply small mutations to 
the original policy – simulating incremental evolution-
ary steps – and derive tests from each mutated policy. 
Essentially these tests are requests together with expec-
tations as to whether or not the request is granted. We 
then disable the visible security mechanisms in the 
application. This is feasible precisely because of the 
existing traceability. Without hidden and implicit 
mechanisms, any request should now be granted. If 
implicit and hidden PDPs are present, in contrast, not 
all requests will be granted. By applying the generated 
tests to the system and comparing the actual with the 
expected access decisions, we extract information on 
implicit and hidden mechanisms.  
Our test-driven approach provides an understanding 
of the technical reasons that restrict the evolution of the 
security policy for legacy systems. Because test cases 
are executable artifacts, they are precious means to 
help pinpoint those parts of the business logic that are 
not flexible w.r.t. the evolution of security policies. 
The contribution of this paper is the proposed 
methodology as well as its empirical validation. 
1.3. Overview 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the background and the objectives, 
namely the detection of hidden and implicit security 
mechanisms. Section 3 presents the methodology, a 
two-stage test-driven assessment method. In a first 
step, the current system is analyzed based on exhaus-
tive testing. In a second step, the system is assessed 
w.r.t. the possible evolutions of the current security 
policy. Experimental results are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents the related works and the conclu-
sion.  
2. Background 
Before detailing the proposed test driven methodol-
ogy to estimate system’s flexibility, we need to provide 
a few fundamental concepts. 
2.1. Access control models  
Advanced access control models [4, 6, 9] allow to 
express rules (a set of rules specifies a SP) that apply 
only under specific circumstances, called contexts. For 
instance, in the health care domain, physicians have 
special permissions in specific contexts such as emer-
gencies. Furthermore, some models provide means to 
specify different SPs for various parts of an organiza-
tion (sub-organizations). In this paper, we will consider 
an access control model in which we can specify per-
missions and prohibitions as a function of temporal and 
spatial contexts, roles, activities, and resources. 
A rule can be a permission or a prohibition. Each 
rule of an SP consists of five parameters that we called 
entities:  a status flag S indicating permission or prohi-
bition, a role, an activity, a view, and a context. Our 
domain consists of role names RN, activity names PN, 
view names VN, and context names CN. A security 
policy SP is thus a set of rules defined by 
CNVNPNRNSSP ××××⊆ , and we will denote concrete 
rules by a predicate Status(Role, Activity, 
View, Context). 
As a running example, we will consider a library 
management system (LMS). Its purpose is to offer 
services to manage books in a public library.  
All users can perform three activities, namely bor-
row, reserve, and return a book. There are also a num-
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ber of administrative tasks that can be executed, but we 
do not need them here. In our model, data items are 
called views. Views are the entities that we want to 
protect from unauthorized access. In our example, 
there are two views, book and account. All entities can 
be hierarchical. In the LMS example, there are two 
types of accounts: borrower and personnel accounts. 
Finally, contexts include temporal contexts such as 
working day or weekend. 
Several access control rules can then be expressed. 
For example, users are allowed to borrow books only 
when the library is open. This rule is defined by  
Permission(Borrower, BorrowBook, Book, Work-
ingDays). Further examples of rules include the prohi-
bition to borrow a book during holidays, the permis-
sion for an administrator to manage the personnel ac-
counts, and the permission for a secretary to consult 
borrower accounts. These examples can be expressed 
by Prohibition(Borrower, BorrowBook, Book, 
Holidays), Permission(Administrator, ManageAc-
cess, PersonnelAccount, always), and Permis-
sion(Secretary, ConsultBorrowerAccount, Bor-
rowerAccount, always). 
For the LMS, the total number of rules is 22. In a 
large scale system, the access control policy may be-
come very complex, due to the large number of roles, 
activities and contexts that are involved. Priorities have 
to be set to specify which rule applies when several 
rules are in conflicts. 
2.2. Visible security mechanisms 
Implementing control over the access to resources of a 
system can be done in a variety of ways. A classical 
architectural pattern is one component that is dedicated 
to access control. Typically, it works as a filter be-
tween the interface of the system and the control logic 
functions (services) or data (e.g. access to the data-
base). If it exists, and if it is mentioned in the docu-
mentation or located through traceability links, such a 
component can be easily modified to implement a new 
security policy. The security mechanism is explicit in 
that it has been created with the objective of control-
ling access. It is also visible since its location in the 
legacy system is known. For instance, PDPs of this 
kind can be specified with Sun’s XACML. This allows 
the management of access control independently from 
the system. All requests pass through the PDP before 
getting to the system. 
In order to illustrate explicit visible mechanisms, 
we consider that the PDP contains a SecurityPoli-
cyService class which is called by the business ser-
vices classes and returns the decision of the request 
(allow or deny). Figure 1  presents the point of view of 
the caller. The business services code of borrowBook 
automatically calls the visible PDP via the Security-
PolicyService.check method.  
 
public  void borrowBook(User user, Book book) 
throws SecuritPolicyViolationException { 
// call to the security service       
ServiceUtils.checkSecurity(user,  
LibrarySecurityModel.BORROWBOOK_METHOD,  
LibrarySecurityModel.BOOK_VIEW,  
ContextManager.getTemporalContext());      
// call to business objects 
// borrow the book for the user 
book.execute(Book.BORROW, user); 
// call the dao class to update the DB  
bookDAO.insertBorrow(userDTO, bookDTO);} 
 Figure 1. An explicit and visible security mechanism 
2.3. Security policy testing  
One aim of security policy testing is to ensure that 
security mechanisms are exercised in every way that 
may lead to a failure. A failure of a security mecha-
nism occurs when an access is granted (resp. prohib-
ited) while the security policy stipulates that it should 
be prohibited (resp. granted). 
As an illustration, consider the top part of Figure 2 
that displays the validation of a current legacy system 
against its security policy. Test cases are derived from 
the security policy SP (1) and the current version of the 
system is tested w.r.t the access rules.  
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Figure 2. Regression testing of the legacy system 
 
A test case is a sequence of method calls on the 
system that ends with a request that the PDP must 
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check. To illustrate the notion of test case, let us con-
sider the LMS: to be reserved, a book has first to be 
borrowed by another user. Any access control rule that 
forbids some users to reserve a specific category of 
books can only be tested after these books have been 
borrowed. The sequence is necessary to reach a state in 
which the rule to be tested can be exercised. 
As shown in Figure 2, each test case is derived 
from a rule of a security policy (1), and calls the PDP 
(2) which, in turn, allows or forbids the access to the 
business logic part of the system (3).  
As an example of a test case, consider testing that a 
secretary is not allowed to update personnel accounts. 
After preparing the test data, the respective service 
method is called. It takes two parameters: a personnel 
account object and a user object (the Secretary class 
extends the User class). The test fails if we do not get a 
security exception. Alternatively, the oracle could 
check that the action was not executed (check in the 
database that the account was not updated). A piece of 
Java code that tests this case is given below. 
 
// preparing test data 
Secretary sec1 = new Secretary(); 
PersonnelAccount pAccount =  
new PersonnelAccount(accoutID); 
// run security test 
try { 
PersonnelAccountSevice.updateAccount(pAccount, 
                                     sec1); 
// test oracle, we expect a security violation 
exception here 
Fail(“test failed, security violation excep-
tion expected here, a secretary is not allowed 
to update personnel accounts”). 
} 
Catch(SecurityPolicyViolationException e) { 
// pass: test successfully executed 
} 
In this example, the oracle is implemented using 
SecurityPolicyViolationException.  Many other im-
plementations are possible for the security outcome. 
Hence, the test can be automated or adapted to the 
specific implementation. 
Formally, the PDP of an SUT, consisting of visi-
ble, implicit, and possibly hidden parts, implements a 
function s from requests, I, to decisions, O. That is, for 
any input vector i ∈I, s(i) ∈O is the actual outcome 
for the request i.  
A test case is a pair (i, p(i)) where i is a request that 
is drawn from a set I. p(i) is the expected outcome 
drawn from a set O={yes,no} with “yes” for permis-
sion and “no” for prohibition. p(i) ∈O is the expected 
or intended outcome as specified by the policy. p is 
the function that specifies the expected behavior, i.e., 
the oracle. For a given request i, a test case verdict is 
“pass” if s(i)=p(i), and it is “fail” otherwise. 
2.4. Regression testing reveals some hidden 
and implicit mechanisms 
We now turn our attention to the ideal case of deal-
ing with a system’s evolution using regression testing. 
It serves as an illustration of the problems that are 
caused by hidden and implicit security mechanisms. 
If policies evolve, testing can be used to assess that 
the new security policy is correctly implemented. The 
bottom part of  Figure 2 presents the ideal scheme of 
regression testing in cases where security policy 
evolves. The tests cases are first applied to the current 
system and then are partially reused on the new sys-
tem, as explained in the following. 
If only the access control policy evolves, the evolu-
tion is iso-functional since the functions of the business 
logic are unchanged. The evolution of a security policy 
consists of adding and removing access rules, and of 
adding and removing roles, activities and contexts. The 
new PDP is modified in accordance with this evolu-
tion. The correctness of the PDP modifications must be 
ensured using regression testing. Test cases corre-
sponding to deleted rules are removed. For instance, in 
Figure 2, the TR1 test case is removed since rule R1 is 
deleted. The test cases remaining ones guarantee the 
non-regression, since they execute the unchanged parts 
of the security policy. New test cases are added for the 
new rules. In Figure 2, TR’i test cases are added for 
testing R’i new rules.  
This ideal regression scheme rarely applies. Even 
for an iso-functional evolution, the unchanged business 
logic can be in contradiction with the new access con-
trol policy, due to implicit or hidden mechanisms.  
The first case of mismatch occurs if an explicit se-
curity mechanism is not visible, i.e., is hidden in the 
legacy system.  
Figure 3 adds a hidden mechanism to the example 
of Figure 1. In the body of the method, after this secu-
rity call has been executed, a new check is done which 
forbids borrowing books during week-ends. Disabling 
the first mechanism will not prevent this hidden prohi-
bition from being executed. If the PDP component is 
modified in order to allow borrowing books during 
week-ends, the hidden mechanism will have to be 
located and deleted. 
 
public void borrowBook(Book b, User user) { 
// visible mechanism, call to the security 
policy service 
SecurityPolicyService.check(user, 
SecurityModel.BORROW_METHOD, Book.class, Se-
curityModel.DEFAULT_CONTEXT); 
// do something else 
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// hidden mechanism 
If(getDayOfWeek().equals(“Sunday”) || getDay-
OfWeek().equals(“Saturday”)) { 
// this is not authorized throw a business 
exception 
Throw new BusinessException(“Not allowed to 
borrow in week-ends);}   …} 
Figure 3. Explicit hidden security mechanism 
A second kind of mismatch is due to implicit con-
straints which restrict the access, due to the way the 
system has been designed, implemented and deployed.  
 
Director
+ updatePersonnelAccount(account)
Account* *
Server
+ updateAccounts(director, account)
+ consultPersonnelAccount(director)
+ consultPersonnelAccount(secretary)
*
*
Secretary
Personnel
+ consultPersonnelAccount()
PersonnelAccountaccess
 
Figure 4. Implicit security mechanism 
By construction, a Secretary cannot directly call 
updatePersonnelAccount. A new access rule may 
specify that the director’s secretary should now have 
access to personnel accounts. Since the program design 
does not have any direct reference from the secretary to 
the personnel accounts, we cannot add a rule “permis-
sion(secretary, update, account, always)”. A simple 
refactoring would consist of moving the association 
“access” and the methods to the level of the class Per-
sonnel. Such a refactoring would also allow any Per-
sonnel instance to access the personnel accounts, 
which may be an unexpected change. So, the program 
will have to be carefully modified in several places to 
implement the desired evolution of the access control 
policy. 
A last, more complicated case occurs when some 
access to a resource is granted by a hidden mechanism. 
In such a case, if the new security policy restricts this 
access, the visible PDP is modified but, depending on 
the execution flow, the user may still have his access 
granted due to the hidden mechanism. 
In conclusion, the implementation of an evolving 
system policy is constrained by hidden and implicit 
security mechanisms. Even with a new PDP which 
implements the new security policy, these mechanisms 
may cause the system execution to fail. In this paper, 
we use testing for the early detection of such inconsis-
tencies in the legacy system. 
 
3. Flexibility analysis of the system to 
assess control policy changes 
The difficulty of implementing an evolving policy 
is obviously related to the number of changes that must 
be applied to the current legacy system to enforce the 
new policy. Modifying the existing code may be more 
or less difficult, depending on the system size, on the 
programming languages (OO, Cobol etc.), and on the 
quality of documentation and design models. However, 
the mere modification of an existing application is 
costly because the legacy system business logic has to 
be analyzed.  
In this paper, we argue that testing offers a prag-
matic way of dealing with this problem and helps esti-
mate the cost of a planned evolution. The test-driven 
evolution process consists of: 
1. assessing the current legacy system, 
2. measuring its flexibility w.r.t. (micro-) evolu-
tions, and 
3. diagnosing which functions and resources of 
the system are causing flexibility problems.  
3.1. Exhaustive test-driven assessment of the 
current legacy system 
The first question is to what extent the business 
logic implements hidden and implicit security mecha-
nisms. These “hard-wired rules” may be redundant or 
even in conflict with some of the visible security 
mechanisms. The ratio of access control rules which 
are “hard-wired” in the business logic can be meas-
ured.  We propose an exhaustive testing approach to 
assess the degree of hard-wiring of the security policy 
in the business logic. Exhaustive testing means that a 
test input is generated for each combination of roles, 
activities, views and contexts. In the top part of Figure 
2, it means that step (1) is replaced by a systematic test 
input generation from the roles, activities, views and 
contexts. The system flexibility is thus measured inde-
pendently from a given security policy but it depends 
on the roles, activities, views and contexts.  
We start by disabling the visible security mecha-
nisms of the legacy system under test. This can mean:  
1. either that all requests should be granted now 
(universal permission), 
2. or that all requests should be denied now (uni-
versal prohibition). 
Recall that in contrast to function p which encodes 
the oracle, function s encodes the actual decisions 
taken by the PDP. Let s+ denote the function that corre-
sponds to the visible PDP that is disabled in the sense 
of universally granting access (i.e., permission). If 
there are no hidden or implicit mechanisms, we would 
expect  
s+(i)=yes for all i ∈I. 
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Similarly, let s- denote the function that corre-
sponds to the visible PDP that is disabled in the sense 
of universally prohibiting access. If there are no hid-
den or implicit mechanisms, we would expect  
s-(i)=no for all i ∈I. 
 
1. Let us first apply an input i to the original SUT 
(no changes in the PDP). If s(i)=p(i), the PDP be-
haves as expected. If s(i)≠p(i), then something is 
wrong – the legacy system does not do what it is 
supposed to do, i.e., what is described in the pol-
icy. In our setting, we may assume that this does 
not happen. We assume that the current system is 
consistent with its actual security policy. 
2. Let us now apply an input i to the SUT with the 
visible PDP universally granting access. 
a. If s+(i)=yes, the result is inconclusive. 
Thus we cannot tell whether or not there is a hid-
den mechanism. Let per1 be the number of test 
executions in this category. 
b. If, in contrast, s+(i)=no, we have detected an im-
plicit or hidden mechanism.  
i. If s(i)=no, we know for sure that disabling the 
visible PDP didn’t have the desired effect. 
One scenario is that a request i1 is passed to 
the visible PDP and then forwarded to a hid-
den PDP which denies access. Disabling the 
visible PDP may mean that i1 is directly 
passed to the hidden PDP. 
ii. Symmetrically, let us assume that s(i)=yes. 
This means that disabling the visible PDP (in 
the sense of universally granting access) all of 
a sudden leads to a prohibition, a case that 
seems somewhat unlikely. However, one pos-
sibility is that in the original system, i1 is 
passed to the explicit PDP which transforms it 
into a distinct request i2 that is sent to the 
hidden PDP. The hidden PDP grants access to 
i2, and hence in sum, s(i1)=yes. Now, if the 
visible PDP is replaced by universal permis-
sion, this may mean that i1 is directly sent to 
the hidden PDP which denies access. 
Either way, a hidden mechanism is detected. 
Let per2 be the number of test executions in 
this category.  
Note that this case is independent of the value 
of p(i). We don’t need to know the actual pol-
icy. 
3. Finally, let us apply an input i to the SUT with the 
visible PDP universally prohibiting access.  
a. If s-(i)=yes, we have detected an implicit or hid-
den mechanism. In this situation, the visible 
PDP is somehow bypassed. Let pro1 be the 
number of test executions in this category. 
i. If s(i)=yes, one scenario is that in the original 
system, a request i1 is first passed to the hid-
den mechanism which is directly granted, that 
is, control is transferred to the program logic 
without consulting the visible PDP. Modify-
ing the visible PDP then obviously does not 
have any consequences. 
ii. If s(i)=no, one possible, albeit admittedly con-
strued, scenario is that a request i1 is passed 
to the hidden PDP in the original system. As-
sume that this hidden PDP logs the reception 
and forwards i1 to the visible PDP who grants 
access. The positive response is passed back 
to the hidden PDP who decides that access 
cannot be granted. However, the hidden PDP 
may be configured in a way that a negative re-
sponse of the explicit PDP (which is what we 
get by universal prohibition) is transformed 
into a positive one. This scenario appears 
rather unlikely but is not impossible. 
b. If, in contrast, s-(i)=no, the result is inconclu-
sive. Let pro2 be the number of test executions 
in this category. 
i. There may not be a hidden mechanism. 
ii. On the other hand, there may well be a hidden 
mechanism whose functioning is masked by 
the universally prohibiting visible PDP. 
Note that this again is independent of the value 
of p(i). 
In sum, the presence of hidden mechanism can be 
proven in those situations where s+(i)=no and where    
s-(i)=yes. Furthermore, the expected output p(i) does 
not matter in cases (2) and (3). The consequence is that 
the expected output part of a test case does not matter 
for our assessment. We “only” need to generate the 
input data for a test case but not the oracle. Further-
more, note that these results are independent of 
whether or not there is a default rule for policy evalua-
tion, simply because the expected outcome p(i) does 
not matter. 
In order to measure the flexibility of a system, let N 
be the number of exhaustive tests that is run. Clearly, 
N=per1+per2 = pro1+pro2.  
The number of test cases that indicate the existence 
of hidden and implicit mechanisms is hence per2+ 
pro1. Conversely, the flexibility of a system is defined 
as the ratio 
2N
  pro2   per1_ +=yflexibilitSystem . 
A value of “1” means that our testing approach did 
not detect any hidden or implicit security mechanism 
(only inconclusive verdicts are emitted). A value of ‘0’ 
means that every visible security mechanisms is dou-
bled by a redundant mechanism which is hidden or 
implicit. When the ratio is close to zero, hidden and/or 
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implicit security mechanisms are detected. These make 
the whole system rigid and its evolution problematic. 
The problem with this approach to measuring sys-
tem flexibility is that it forces all combinations of pos-
sible requests to be executed. It means, that a sequence 
must be produced for each possible input i. The num-
ber of test cases then amounts to 
CNVNPNRNN ×××= , 
which may be huge, depending on the number of 
roles, activities, views and contexts. 
3.2. Test Selection for assessing system flexi-
bility 
In order to overcome this problem, we now take 
into consideration the old and the new policies. The 
expert responsible for the security policy evolutions 
may want to know how much effort will be needed in 
terms of code and design refactoring. So only the hid-
den and implicit mechanisms that would block an evo-
lution have to be detected.  
a Test case criterion 
In [8], we studied several test criteria to derive test 
cases from a security policy, including an analysis on 
the grounds of mutation analysis. Several mutation 
operators were proposed: a mutant differs from the 
initial code by the introduction of a single flaw into the 
security mechanism. The mutation score corresponds 
to the proportion of faulty versions of the system which 
are detected (or “killed”) by the test cases.  In the cited 
paper, an efficient criterion has been identified which 
consists of deriving at least one test case per concrete 
access control rule (some rule may be generic in the 
sense they apply to a category of roles or activities or 
context). 
In the following, we use this criterion for our ex-
periments. The approach could be easily adapted to 
other criteria. The underlying assumption is that we 
have a set of test cases which are able to exercise and 
test each access control rule.  
b Decomposing policy evolutions 
The evolution of a security policy can be decom-
posed into micro steps as presented in Figure 5: 
1. δ+ for relaxing a policy (addition of a permis-
sion or removal of a prohibition), 
2. δ-   for restricting a policy (addition of a pro-
hibition or removal of a permission). 
 
 
Initial SP
(δ- | δ+)*
Final SP
 
Figure 5. Decomposition of the SP evolution into mi-
cro steps 
Let SP be a security policy, i.e., a set of permission 
and prohibition rules. Each micro-evolution results in a 
new security policy. We denote by SP- the set of poli-
cies resulting from the restriction of the initial security 
policy (addition of a new prohibition, removal of a 
permission), and by SP+ the security policies obtained 
by relaxing the initial policy (addition of a new permis-
sion, removal of a prohibition). We assume that a pol-
icy SP consists of two disjoint sets Perm and Pro that 
contain the permissions and prohibitions, respectively. 
Hence, ProPermSP ∪= . The set NewPerm contains all 
those permissions that can be added to the security 
policy. Similarly, NewPro contains all the prohibitions 
that can be added to the policy. Activities and views 
are not enumerated here for the reason that some ac-
tivities cannot be used with every view (for example 
borrow can only be used with the book view). When 
adding a new rule we hence reuse activities with com-
patible views only. 
(_,_, , ,_)
,
(_,_, , ,_)
,
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∈ ∈
∈
∈ ∈
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Activities and views are not enumerated here for 
the reason that activities are linked to specific views 
(for example borrow can only be used with the book 
view). When adding a new rule we reuse activities with 
compatible views. SP- and SP+ are then defined as 
follows: 
{ { }} { { }}
{ { }} { { }}
pro Pro nperm NewPerm
perm Perm npro NewPro
SP SP pro SP nperm
SP SP perm SP npro
+
∈ ∈
−
∈ ∈
= − ∪ ∪
= − ∪ ∪
∪ ∪
∪ ∪
 
 
c Measuring system’s flexibility for a given SP  
Based on a given security policy and on all possible 
evolutions, we are now ready to estimate the overall 
flexibility of a legacy system. By applying micro-
evolutions, we also expect to get an idea of the func-
tionalities and resources which are the subject of hid-
den or implicit access restrictions. The analysis of 
flexibility should help pinpointing those parts of the 
system which are flexible when the SP evolves.  
Figure 6 depicts a test-driven technique to provide 
such an estimate. From an initial security policy 
1. all possible security policy micro-evolutions 
are built,  
2. for micro evolutions, the associated visible 
mechanisms are disabled, 
3. for each micro-evolution, a test case is gener-
ated to test the evolution and applied to the 
business logic, 
4. if the test case fails (detects an error), it means 
that the micro-evolution cannot be supported 
by the existing business logic without analysis 
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and possibly refactoring. The legacy system 
cannot easily evolve in that direction.   
SP
SP1
SP2
SP3
SP4
SPn
SP-1
SP-2
SP-3
SP-4
SP-p
……
δ+δ-
δ- = restrict the access control
δ+ = relax the access control
Test δ-
on 
Business logic
Test δ+
on 
Business logic
¬ok
¬ok
¬ok
ok
ok
¬ok
¬ok
¬ok
ok
ok
 
Figure 6. Micro-evolutions of a legacy system access 
control policy 
Let TSP+ (resp. TSP-) denote the test cases set built 
for testing each δ+ (resp. δ- ) micro-evolution. We 
denote by tsp(pass) a pass verdict for a test case tsp, 
the overall flexibility of the legacy system for a given 
security policy SP, tested with the test suite TSP, is 
equal to:  
{ } { }
yflexibilitrigidity
SPSP
passtspTSPtsppasstspTSPtsp
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i j
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Example: Consider 20 test cases used to test the 20 
possible micro-evolutions: If 5 of them are executed 
and detect a failure (either a prohibition when permis-
sion is expected or a permission when a prohibition is 
expected), the flexibility for micro-evolutions is equal 
to 0.75. One evolution in four cannot be done without 
analyzing the business logic.  
3.3. Locating rigidity in the system 
At each step, the analysis of micro-evolutions pro-
vides a useful diagnosis of those parts of the legacy 
system which are constrained by hidden or implicit 
security mechanism. The parts which cause the system 
to be “rigid” can be classified. The analysis we propose 
is two-fold. 
1. Access to resources analysis: measuring the 
flexibility related to each resource (view) of 
the legacy system: detection of problematic re-
sources. 
2. Access to functions analysis: measuring the 
flexibility related to each function (activity) in-
teracting with a resource. 
First, the degree to which a given resource is “pro-
tected” by hidden or implicit mechanisms is obtained. 
This is an estimate of the flexibility related to a given 
resource. For a view v (which corresponds to the data 
and resources of the system), we define: 
Resource_flexibility(v)= percentage of test cases 
which pass when testing a rule related to the view 
(resource) v. Let TSPv be the test cases set exercizing 
the rules related to a view v, we have:   
{ }
TSPv
passtspTSPvtsp
vyflexibilitresource
)(/
)(_
∈
=
 
 
Second, the flexibility of system functions can be 
estimated in the same way. For an activity a (corre-
sponding to a system’s functions), we have: 
Function_flexibility(a)= percentage of test cases 
which pass when testing a rule related to the activity 
(function) a. Let TSPa be the test cases set exercizing 
the rules related to an activity a, we have:   
 
{ }
TSPa
passtspTSPatsp
ayflexibilitFunction
)(/
)(_
∈
=
 
3.4. Test-driven evolution in practice 
The flexibility measurement we propose provides 
an analysis of the micro-evolutions that the business 
logic may accept without refactorings and modifica-
tions. In practice, it is not necessary to make a com-
plete analysis of the current system flexibility when a 
new policy is defined. Let SPinit be the initial security 
policy, and SPtarg the target security policy. The evo-
lution from SPinit to SPtarg can be decomposed into 
micro steps (maybe with many possible solutions) 
n.compositiofunction  a  and
evolution-micro  aor   aeither  denotes where
)(....arg)( 121
D
DD
+−+−
+−+−
−
+−
−
+−
==∆
δδδ
δδδδ
i
nnn SPinitSPtSPinit  
The test driven process is similar to the test driven 
development principles promoted with XP. This test 
driven evolution technique involves repeatedly: 
- writing a test case associated to the +−iδ micro-
evolution; 
- detecting a potential rigidity in the legacy sys-
tem; 
- fixing the problem to pass the test; 
- then implementing – and documenting – only 
the micro-step in the PDP.  
This pragmatic approach assists the safe evolution 
of a legacy system. 
4. Experiments and discussion 
We applied our technique to three examples: 
• An auctions sales management system (ASMS) 
containing 10703 lines of code, 122 classes 
and 797 methods; 
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• a virtual meeting management system 
(VMMS) containing 6077 lines of code, 134 
classes and 581 methods; and 
• a library management system (LMS) contain-
ing 3204 lines of code, 62 classes and 335 
methods. 
The three case studies have a typical 3-tiers archi-
tecture widely used for web applications. We use the 
OrBAC [4, 5] environment as a specification language 
to define the access control rules. 
4.1. VMS results 
The virtual meeting system offers simplified web 
conference services. It is used in an advanced software 
engineering course at the University of Rennes. The 
virtual meeting server allows meetings to be organized 
on a distributed platform. When connected to the 
server, a user can enter or exit a meeting, ask to speak, 
speak, or plan new meetings. Each meeting has a man-
ager. The manager is the person who has planned the 
meeting and has set its main parameters (such as its 
name, its agenda, etc). Each meeting may also have a 
moderator, appointed by the meeting manager. The 
moderator gives the floor to a participant who has 
asked to speak. 
In the following table we present the results for the 
VMS. The overall flexibility of the initial policy is 
0.35, which means that 35% of the security rules 
should be modifiable without code and design refactor-
ings. It also reveals that the remaining is constrained 
by hidden/implicit security mechanisms.  
 
 Flex. rules Rigid Rules System 
flexibility 
results 20 36 0.35 
 
To obtain a more accurate diagnosis, we consider 
which resources and views are the subjects of hid-
den/implicit mechanisms:  
 
Resource\View Flex. 
rules 
Rigid rules All Flexibility 
Meeting 12 36 48 0.25 
PersonnelAccount 6 0 6 1 
UserAccount 2 0 2 1 
 
This table leads to the understanding that any evo-
lution concerning PersonnelAccount or UserAccount 
is possible and that the problems of rigidity concern the 
Meeting resource. We can go further in the analysis 
and check which functions/activities are flexible in 
terms of security policy micro-evolutions. The results 
show –without surprise – that the functions which are 
more rigid are related to the Meeting manipulation. It 
also reveals that some of the functions related to this 
resource are flexible (like opening a meeting). 
 
Function/Activity Flexibility 
updatePersonnelAccount 1 
updateUserAccount 1 
askToSpeak 0.13 
leaveMeeting 0.14 
overSpeaking 1 
closeMeeting 1 
setMeetingAgenda 0.14 
setMeetingModerator 0.14 
speakInMeeting 0.14 
setMeetingTitle 0.14 
deleteUserAccount 1 
openMeeting 1 
handover 1 
deletePersonnelAccount 1 
4.2. Auction Sales management system  
The ASMS allows users to buy or sell items online. 
A seller can start an auction by submitting a descrip-
tion of the item he wants to sell and a minimum price 
(with a start date and an ending date for the auction). 
Then a typical bidding process starts, and people can 
bid on this auction. One specific feature of this system 
is that a buyer must have enough money in his account 
before bidding. 
We obtained the following results for the ASMS. 
The system flexibility value is very close to the previ-
ous example and the diagnosis allows determining that 
only the Comment resource can support security evolu-
tions without restriction. Concerning the other re-
sources, UserAccount cannot evolve at all without 
modifying the code. Only 16% of the possible evolu-
tions can be applied without problems to the Bid re-
source and 31% for PersonnelAccount. The activi-
ties/functions which are the cause of these rigidity 
problems can be located more precisely with the last 
table. For both VMMS and ASMS, we found implicit 
mechanisms similar to the one presented in Figure 4. 
Only δ+ evolutions were problematic, which means 
that no hidden mechanism has been detected which 
grants permission while a prohibition is expected. No 
hidden mechanisms were detected, which may be ex-
plained by the fact the systems are new (not real “old” 
legacy systems), the business model designs are object-
oriented, and that the PDPs are centralized in dedicated 
classes. In such cases, the main rigidity is caused by 
design constraints, i.e. implicit mechanisms, which 
only restrict the δ+ evolutions (relaxing access). 
 
Resource\View Flex. 
rules 
Rigid rules All Flexibility 
Comment 5 0 5 1 
Bid 1 5 6 0.16 
PersonnelAccount 5 11 16 0.31 
UserAccount 0 5 5 0 
Function/Activity Flexibility 
updatePersonnelAccount 1 
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consultBid 0 
consultComment 1 
postComment 1 
consultOldBids 0 
updateBid 0 
deleteBid 0.69 
deleteComment 1 
deleteUserAccount 0 
consultPersonnelAccount 0 
deletePersonnelAccount 0 
4.3.  LMS: Library Management System 
The library management system is interesting since 
it is fully flexible. In fact, based on the return of ex-
perience of the two first studies, we built it to be flexi-
ble: the business model contains a Role class and al-
lows the access to be fully controlled from the PDP. 
The principle for building a business model with no 
implicit mechanism may consists of making the access 
control concepts explicit (reification) in the business 
model. 
5. Related work and conclusion 
As far as we know, no previous studies focused on 
the problem of automatically identifying im-
plicit/hidden access control mechanisms in legacy 
systems. Xie et al.[10] propose a machine learning 
algorithm to infer properties of XACML policies. This 
approach focuses on the PDP and infers the policy 
properties by analyzing request-response pairs. Their 
approach does not consider the whole system (PDP + 
system). As pointed out by [11], guiding the systems 
security policy evolution is a challenging issue. Our 
test-driven technique suggests that testing is a prag-
matic technique to detect and locate (either using ex-
haustive or security policy based testing) hid-
den/implicit security mechanisms which might make 
the legacy evolution a nightmare for domain experts. 
The approach is still dependent on the generation of SP 
test cases. The issue of automating test generation can 
be addressed using combinatorial [12] or computa-
tional intelligence algorithms [13, 14].  Future work 
will focus on more complex evolution scenarios, in-
cluding merging several organizations policies. 
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